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i
n a global context of widespread liberalization and a growing political impor-
tance given to issues of so-called sustainable development, agriculture has 
not proved the exception to the transversal phenomenon of the privatization 
of standards. in response to the growing industrialization of agricultural 
production methods, to the proliferation of large-scale agricultural pollution 
and to a growing awareness of the working conditions of farmers and agricul-
tural workers from the “South”, the theme of sustainable development has 
become increasingly visible. in parallel to the development of public policy 
and other international agreements, private standards have increased, which 
have a declared intention of encouraging farmers to minimize their negative 
impacts from an environmental and social point of view.
While corresponding to a variety of objectives and/or secondary aims in the field of 
sustainable development (organic agriculture, fair trade, food safety issues, respon-
sible production, ethics, etc.), these standards refer however to similar institutional 
and procedural schemes. Based on specifications of environmental and/or social 
“best practices”, such standards are often – but not always1 – associated with specific 
labels or statements on products, which enable consumers to identify them. producers 
adopt these specifications voluntarily (hence they are known as voluntary standards) 
and “third party certification” procedures are employed to monitor compliance – 
where an auditor ensures that farm practices conform to specifications. producers 
1.  We distinguish “business to business” standards, which are not visible to end consumers but serve as trace-
ability insurance and a guarantee between the various operators in the food chain, from “business to consumer” 
standards, which have an associated label aimed at the final consumer.
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“organic farming”, “fair trade”, “responsible” products... private stand-
ards such as these have multiplied to encourage farmers to participate 
in voluntary quality approaches. Combined with retailer standards, 
such voluntary approaches are increasingly necessary to ensure market 
access and are used as reference by public authorities.
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are awarded with the corresponding label if standards are met, which can be used 
on their products to promote sales or marketing opportunities.
as already demonstrated (fouilleux, 2010), various devices are gathered under 
the term private voluntary standards2. Using examples from the agri-food sector, 
the first part of this paper shows that despite this variety, standards tend towards 
convergence and transnationalization. the second part reviews the debate that exists 
between public and private spheres that is generated by the use of private standards 
as an increasingly powerful form of control. 
A short history oF voluntAry stAndArds: 
trAnsnAtionAlizAtion oF orgAnizAtions And 
instruments
orgAnic Agriculture stAndArds among the different types of private standards, 
some are managed by politically and/or socially-oriented organizations. this is the 
case for organic agriculture, an area where alternative producer groups identified 
certain consumer concerns and implemented relevant standards. Such standards 
were originally private, to be followed by government regulation in france (1981), 
the european Union (1992), and the rest of the world (more than 60 governments 
have now established public regulations in organic farming). in parallel, hundreds of 
private organic standards also exist throughout the world, which vary considerably 
in terms of the number of farmers and volumes of products involved. While initially 
organic farming was structured primarily within the european Union, and more 
generally in industrialized countries, it has gradually extended to include so-called 
“Southern” or “developing” countries, mainly as product exporters to european 
and US markets. organic standards were the first to be organized internationally, 
which was carried out through the international federation of organic agriculture 
movement (ifoam), founded in 1972 at the initiative of the french nature and 
progress association, the British Soil association, a Danish group of biodynamic 
farmers and the rodale institute, a leading advocate of organic farming in the United 
States. ifoam has played an important role in the dissemination of organic agricul-
ture throughout the world.
as producer associations, consumers, government policies, businesses and other 
economic agents were mobilized, a real “global organic agriculture sector” was gradu-
ally institutionalized (raynolds, 2004). the first formal international specifications 
– although initially vague – defining organic production were established in 1980, the 
“voluntary standard” instrument and its associated “third party certification” dimen-
sion undoubtedly had a role in the structuring, institutionalization and consolidation 
of a global market for certified organic products. initially, the producer groups that 
had set up the initial specifications developed the certification; farmers inspected 
each other on a voluntary basis involving mutual knowledge and trust. then, a sharp 
2. many public voluntary standards also exist, such as geographical indications in europe, the label rouge in 
france.
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increase in trade flows and an increase in the amount of organic sales by supermar-
kets (which are now the main retailers of such products, selling far greater quanti-
ties than speciality shops (Daviron and vagneron, 2011)) led to an increase in the 
number of standards and practices that took on a more market-oriented significance, 
creating conflicts and political contradictions all the way up to the ifoam level.
indeed, the increasing formalization of specifications – linked to the need to provide 
criteria and indicators to enable certifiers to make objective and straightforward 
measurements during audits – has gradually diluted the initial objectives of the 
founders of the organic movement, who emphasized the need for a systemic, holistic 
and ad hoc approach to agriculture and the interactions between humans, nature and 
agriculture. While ifoam still tolerates less formalized specifications and alternative 
control systems, it now gives particular emphasis to third party certification, which 
it justifies by the demands of markets and states. in addition to ifoam standards 
that producers can adopt directly, ifoam is now proposing a multilateral system 
of equivalence (a kind of organic “meta-standard”), which could accompany other 
organic standards, whether public or private, and allow producers to use the ifoam 
logo next to those of other standards.
FAir trAde stAndArds fair trade provides another example of a voluntary standard 
initially supported by private citizens engaged in explicitly political projects. this 
movement was originally structured around militant organizations based mainly 
in europe (and the US), who purchased products directly from producer organiza-
tions in developing countries, which they then sold to consumers via a network of 
speciality shops. these shops – part of the “Magasins du Monde” organization – sell 
products under their own name (Traidcraft, Oxfam, Solidaridad, Equal Exchange, 
Artisans du Monde), particularly local crafts (although including some agricultural 
products, especially coffee). in this model, rather than a shared common standard 
and a certified label, product equity is guaranteed to the consumer by long-estab-
lished relationships of trust between producers, buyers and the place of purchase 
(Daviron and vagneron, 2011). this model is now embodied in the comprehensive 
plan by the World fair trade organization (Wfto) that endorses an approach based 
on trust and peer review, known as an “integrated system”, which it considers as a 
more suitable method than third party certification.
however, the speciality stores model has faced strong competition since the late 
1980s from the development of a second generation of fair trade initiatives, based 
on standardization and third party certification. the max haavelar foundation, 
established in the netherlands in 1988 by a Dutch priest and an executive from the 
Dutch development nGo Solidaridad, is considered the first initiative to standardize 
fair trade. With labelling and third party certification, the aim was to develop a 
larger market by selling products in supermarkets, generating increased support to 
producer incomes in developing countries (raynolds et al., 2007). the immediate 
success of max haavelar with consumers induced a proliferation of standardiza-
tion initiatives and the considerable diversification of stakeholders that supported 
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the standards. Given this explosion of initiatives in 1997, the fair trade labelling 
organisation (flo) was created to unite fair trade labelling organizations, and it 
today gathers 24 national members, including 19 standards organisations or “label-
ling initiatives” (covering 23 countries) and three networks of certified producers 
(africa, 2004; latin america, 2004; and asia 2005). in addition to representing and 
promoting the development of fair trade, flo’s main activity is to formulate and 
revise the various fair trade specifications according to products – in other words, 
once again, global meta-standards.
retAiler stAndArds a third type of private voluntary standards should also be 
mentioned, one that is particularly important in the agri-food industry: “retailer” 
standards. they are unrelated to organic or fair trade standards by the way in which 
they are aimed at the mainstream and not at “niche” markets and they are not based 
on explicitly political objectives. Such standards, for example GlobalGap and ifS3, 
are utilised by stakeholders involved in large-scale retailing. GlobalGap specifications 
vary according to product type. they include a set of basic specific requirements, as 
well as additional stricter criteria that are recommended but not mandatory, allowing 
the definition of several certification “levels”.
GlobalGap standards were created in 1997 under the name of eurepGap (euro-
retailer produce working group for good agricultural practices) and were originally 
to be applied exclusively to food safety issues. the standards resulted from an initia-
tive of the key stakeholders involved in european supermarkets, who participated 
in the eurep working group, under strong British influence from companies such as 
tesco and Sainsbury’s. the use of GlobalGap standards was later extended beyond 
issues of food safety, and their specifications now integrate sustainable development 
along with social, environmental and ethical concerns.
these private standards are not a priori obligatory and their application remains 
theoretically voluntary, but the fact that all major retailers demand such standards 
explains their very rapid extension and widespread implementation. in fact, for many 
purposes, these standards have replaced public standards (Jaffee and henson, 2004). 
moreover, because of the extent of their application, eurepGap standards were often 
assumed to be obligatory by countries that exported to the european Union, and that 
to avoid confusion with mandatory public standards the eU pushed for the name 
to be changed to GlobalGap, which was achieved in September 2007. in addition, 
due to the market power of retailer standards, they are more often used as refer-
ence for governments: they are sometimes used as explicit objectives or as a “basis” 
for national and international public policy. thus, to assist producers with their 
upgrading of operations and practices, and to “facilitate their market access”, courses 
are funded and delivered and grants are specifically targeted by public policies for 
the implementation of these private standards.
3.  these two examples are european, but a similar situation exists in the United States or australia for example, 
concerning similar standards.
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multi-stAkeholder stAndArds For sustAinAble commodities finally, a fourth 
category of standards has emerged in the 2000s with explicit focus on “sustainability” 
or “responsibility”. these standards are characterized by the governance structures 
that produce them, which involve specific so-called “multi-stakeholder” decision-
making processes; and the related standardization organizations are often called 
“round tables”. these organizations claim that their functioning is based on inclu-
sive and participatory processes described as “democratic” because they allow all 
those involved or concerned with the commodity and sector in question (producers, 
financiers, importers, agri-food industries, upstream industries, exporters, supermar-
kets, social and environmental nGos) to provide input and contribute to decisions. 
round tables are based on equitable representation of the different stakeholders and 
on very precise and codified participatory procedures, and the mode of interaction 
within them is mainly based on the continuous search for consensus.
initially applied to forests (fSC – forest Stewardship Council, 1993) and then 
fisheries (mSC – marine Stewardship Council, 1999), and also established for textiles 
and mining among others, sustainable multi-stakeholder voluntary standards have 
increased in the last decade for agricultural commodities originating from the tropics 
and traded on international markets. examples include the roundtable on Sustain-
able palm oil (rSpo, 2003) and on responsible Soy (rtrS, 2005) and also for sugar 
cane (BSCi, 2006), biofuels (rSB, 2007), cotton (BCi, 2007), etc.
iseAl, the globAl AssociAtion For sustAinAbility stAndArds this brief overview 
shows the coexistence of different standard types (organic agriculture, fair trade, 
retailer, sustainable commodity standards), each marked by a tendency towards 
international or transnational organization (ifoam, flo and Wfto, GlobalGap). 
it should also be noted that this tendency towards organization on a transnational 
scale asserts itself despite the objective competition between different standards of 
Box 1 do retAiler stAndArds work in the interest oF producers?
retailer standards exemplify the 
power relationships that volun-
tary standards can exacerbate in 
each sector. indeed, besides the 
fact that they provide a way for 
retailers to differentiate them-
selves from their competitors, the 
standards can be used to antici-
pate regulatory changes or as a 
form of risk management by its 
transference onto upstream oper-
ators (henson, 2008). moreover, 
the requirement for specific stand-
ards by retailers, who control virtu-
ally all of the market, constitutes a 
real barrier to entry into european 
markets and represent a significant 
risk of excluding small producers, 
including those from developing 
countries: if they are not of suffi-
cient size and cannot afford addi-
tional certification costs – or rather 
the various certifications necessary 
for export – they will go out of busi-
ness. So while GlobalGap stand-
ards claim to work “in the inter-
ests of producers”, several studies 
highlight the fact that they are of 
most benefit to large supermarket 
chains, increasing their regulatory 
capacity while reducing their direct 
supervision and support, thus mini-
mizing their liability in case of prob-
lems, with the costs being carried 
forward to producers and proces-
sors (hatanaka et al., 2005; henson, 
2008). for some critics, such stand-
ards and public programmes are 
likely to lead to “a reinvention of 
european colonial food relations” 
(Campbell, 2005), by encouraging 
farmers in developing countries to 
export, rather than to provide for 
the local market. 
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the same type: rather than competing over the exact content of specifications or on 
the practical feasibility of corresponding audits, or seeking to obtain the maximum 
amount of potential customers for a product or region, it is primarily in the interest 
of standards organizations to cooperate to establish themselves as credible and effec-
tive, and therefore legitimate, regulators. in a similar way, and further strengthening 
the trend towards convergence, since the mid-2000s there has been a gradual estab-
lishment of the iSeal (international Social and environmental accreditation and 
labelling) alliance, an organization that aims to combine different standard types.
in many ways, iSeal is a functional equivalent of the iSo (international Standards 
organization) specializing in the field of voluntary environmental and social 
standards, which aims to unite and harmonize the different standard types. launched 
in 1999 by members of four pioneering voluntary standards organizations (fSC, 
ifoam, flo and mSC) to address the risks of confusion and of a declining credibility 
of standards, its formal status as a non-profit organization was established in 2002. 
its membership now comprises 12 standardization (and accreditation) bodies and 
seven associate members. this membership includes standards for fair trade (flo, 
Utz certified) as well as GlobalGap or standards such as the Common Code for the 
Coffee Community or the Better Sugar Cane initiative for example, as well as organi-
zations related to organic farming (ifoam until 2010, ioaS).
iSeal presents itself as “the global association for social and environmental 
standards”, a “community of practice” which aims to “create a world where environ-
mental sustainability and social justice are the normal conditions of business”. the 
main activity of iSeal is to develop “best practices” for the producers of sectorial 
standards (considered as clients), which are used as procedural rules for the produc-
tion of “good” voluntary standards in environmental and social fields. these criteria 
are contained in meta-standards (codes) that aim to guide members in the devel-
opment, improvement and strengthening of standards. there are four main codes: 
a “Code of ethics”, a “Code of Good practice for Setting Social and environmental 
Standards,” a “Code of Good practice for assessing the impacts of Social and environ-
mental Standards Systems” and a “Code for assuring Compliance with Social and 
environmental Standards”. another important activity of iSeal is to promote private 
voluntary standards to states, international organizations, academic communities, 
private firms, etc. as effective regulatory instruments.
privAte stAndArds And public stAndArds: A 
distinction thAt is less thAn cleAr…
Despite their great diversity, the standards discussed above have much in common. 
they are based on the same principle: regulation through the market. in theory, 
through the purchasing of certified products, consumers encourage the establish-
ment of more socially fair and environmentally friendly production conditions. in 
this regard, the regulatory dimension is secondary: it is the market that guides the 
type of productive practices. the implementation and monitoring of standards is 
based almost exclusively on private actors, including certifiers and independent 
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organizations accredited by the standard holder. as a service provider, certification 
agencies are paid by producers to monitor their practices for compliance with the 
specifications of a particular standard. agencies conduct audits of producer practices 
and ultimately decide whether or not a corresponding label is to be granted. third 
party certification creates considerable economic activity and certifiers have a vested 
interest in the proliferation of voluntary standards (Djama et al., 2011). public or 
private, voluntary standards are a form of privatization of the regulation process.
another striking feature that emerges from a study of the proliferation of private 
standards is that they all claim to aim for the common good, to produce a “public 
good”. thus, we can see in the willingness shown by standards organizations to 
emphasize the “democratic” nature of their decision-making processes an aspiration 
to compete with, if not to replace, public decisions in terms of legitimacy. rhetoric 
highlighting the benefits of private management of environmental and social issues 
stems from two academic schools of thoughts: the first being political science, where 
it draws on the most normative work of the school of global governance, which 
emphasizes the inability, considered to be both structural and functional, of public 
authorities to deal with the complex issues related to globalization and the benefits 
expected from an increased involvement of private actors in the framework of public-
private partnerships (reinicke, 1998); and the second is management science, where 
it derives from the work on the concept of corporate social responsibility (CSr), which 
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would give companies crucial comparative advantages in a competitive environment 
(porter and Kramer, 2006). at the meeting point between these two areas, a vast 
literature has developed on collaborative governance methods that propose ideal 
procedures to ensure legitimate decisions on a given issue, based on procedures 
involving multiple stakeholders (van huijstee and Glasbergen, 2008; Zadek, 2008). 
these models directly inspire the sustainable standards mentioned above as well as 
the good practices promoted by iSeal.
however, an increasing number of studies stress the limitations of these devices 
in terms of equity and inclusiveness. empirical observation of the functioning of 
the round tables on “responsible Soy” (rtrS) and “Sustainable palm oil” (rSpo) 
provide an obvious illustration. the governance structures of these round tables 
gather together the various operators in the relevant sector, who are expected to 
deliberate among themselves to decide the specifications and management proce-
dures of the certified sectors. however, an analysis of the situation reveals several 
problems: the number of members present in each category (over-representation 
of the industry), their representation within each category (influence of interna-
tional nGos compared to local nGos, lack of direct representation of small farmers), 
unequal distribution of discursive resources between actors (i.e. unequal represen-
tation in the process of forming a consensus and on the definition of what is, or is 
not, considered debatable) (Cheyns, 2011).
moreover, beyond the rhetoric, private standards are in many ways related to the 
public authorities. many of them are directly supported, including financially, by 
governments. the international financial Corporation (ifC), for example, which 
is the branch of the World Bank Group dedicated to financing the private sector, is 
a direct member of several round tables. many of its fund allocation programmes 
Box 2 are standards orGanizations inclusive? 
the various standards organizations 
do not all operate in the same way 
and some appear more truly inclu-
sive than others. for example, in 
the rSpo there are seven catego-
ries of stakeholders among which 
five represent the different stages 
of the value chain (production, 
industry, finance, etc.) and two are 
nGo categories respectively repre-
senting social and environmental 
interests. in the rtrS, social and 
environmental nGos are grouped 
into one “civil society” category, 
ahead of a “producer” category 
and an “industry” category. there 
is therefore a noticeable differ-
ence between these two round 
tables and the forest Stewardship 
Council (fSC), which is their histor-
ical model. the fSC is divided into 
three chambers, “economic”, “envi-
ronmental” and “social”, each with 
an equal percentage of voting rights. 
Compared to the fSC, the rSpo and 
rtrS associations therefore allocate 
much greater power to economic 
interests at the expense of nGos 
in terms of the formal allocation 
of seats: 75% of votes on the rSpo 
board and 66.6% for the rtrS, 
compared with only 33.3% in the 
fSC. in addition, in the fSC, 50% 
of the votes within each chamber 
are distributed to representatives of 
the South and 50% to its members 
of the north. Such a division is not 
made in the rSpo, or in the rtrS, 
or in any other sustainable stand-
ardization initiative for agricultural 
commodities. Despite characteristics 
that appear more equitable, actors 
of other round tables often regard 
the provisions of the fSC as overly 
cumbersome and inefficient in terms 
of decision-making, some even refer-
ring to it as a “psychotic democracy” 
(Bartley and Smith, 2010).
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require beneficiary companies to participate in the round tables. various states are 
also involved. in all sectors, there is particularly active bilateral cooperation from the 
US, Canada, Britain, Germany and Sweden. While in agriculture, the netherlands, 
Germany and Switzerland play leading roles. Dutch cooperative agencies have devel-
oped programmes such as the Sustainable trade initiative to encourage sustainability 
in international trade, which particularly involve the establishment of transnational 
private voluntary standards. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Germany has also 
been very active in the support of sustainable standards and has directly participated 
in the launch of several round tables, including the 4C association (Common Code 
for the Coffee Community), in association with cooperation from Switzerland. in 
parallel, national cooperation agencies are also taking an active role in the defence 
of voluntary standards as regulatory instruments. Conferences, such as in Berlin in 
2006 and 2008, are frequently organized to bring together the sustainable standards 
community as actors and to promote these regulatory tools, to “expand and deepen 
the positive effects” of voluntary standards and to “make them a mainstream phenom-
enon”. the term paradigm shift has even been used. finally, there is a proliferation of 
institutionalized transnational networks that combine public and private authorities 
on the issue of private voluntary standards. three such examples are given below:
the trade Standards practitioners network (tSpn), launched by the German 
Cooperation agency, USaiD and the World Bank, brings together various organiza-
tions and institutions involved in standard setting and capacity building in related 
fields. the tSpn consists of three main working groups. the first is aimed at policy 
makers in developing countries, including through a guide that aims to help them 
“understand the catalytic function of voluntary standards for development and their role 
in the success of export strategies”. the second aims to “maximize the positive impacts 
of the actions of cooperation and technical assistance related to standards (...) and to 
ensure the sustainability of these impacts”. it aims to define a shared understanding 
of the impacts of standards, and to provide the tools to measure them. this type of 
evaluation relates to particular techniques, which is a highly political area: measuring 
the impact of standards ultimately enables them to be classified as “good” or “bad” 
instruments; and also, according to the criteria used, the value of a standard can 
be calculated in completely different ways. the third working group of the tSpn, 
which is mainly led by the ifC, is specifically aimed at the private sector in developing 
countries to increase the commitment to voluntary standards initiatives by its actors 
(international companies in these countries that source from international markets, 
exporters in developing countries, national and international companies that provide, 
on a commercial basis, services in connection with the voluntary standards – certifica-
tion agencies, auditing offices and training providers). this refers to an obvious issue 
of legitimacy and to a recurring problem for the different standards systems: they 
can only be developed if the economic actors in the field adopt them. the promoters 
of these systems therefore develop methods of persuasion in this direction.
launched in 2003 at the initiative of the Canadian think tank iiSD and the United 
nations Commission on trade and Development (UnCtaD), the Sustainable 
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Commodity initiative (SCi) promotes sustainable standards as a potential driver for 
a paradigm shift: “voluntary supply-chain approaches have the potential to establish a 
new paradigm for commodity production and trade.” the projects relating to the SCi 
bring together dozens of partner organizations of all types (companies, cooperation 
and development agencies, many research organizations, international organiza-
tions, consulting firms, tSpn, standards organizations, iSeal, certifiers, etc.) that 
“collectively support initiatives to improve the sustainability of international trade 
and global markets for raw materials”. SCi faces the challenge of assembling and 
disseminating as much information as possible on sustainable standards systems 
and to produce specific knowledge to refine and improve them in terms of impact 
assessment, capacity building and training, financing and the reporting of standards 
information. all of these works also share a clearly and explicitly political goal: to 
influence public authorities so that public policies support and promote sustain-
able standards.
finally, the trade for Sustainable Development (t4SD) project is supported by the 
international trade Centre, an organization formed jointly by the UnCtaD and Wto. 
it aims to establish a comprehensive database of all existing sustainable standards 
systems, a training programme, and a research observatory on the subject. While 
t4SD defines itself as “a Un sponsored neutral information repository”, it provides 
many examples that illustrate the political dimension of the production of knowl-
edge on sustainable standards and the competitive relationships that sometimes 
cause standards organizations to oppose each other. for example, during a meeting 
in amsterdam organised by iSeal, the representative of the German fSC explained 
her reluctance vis-à-vis the creation of the t4SD database and her annoyance that 
iSeal was encouraging its members to work with the itC: she was sceptical about the 
way in which the itC measured the impacts and the criteria that they might employ, 
which could disadvantage her organization in favour of its main rival pefC. indeed, 
since the pefC certifies more timber than the fSC, but based on less demanding 
specifications, if performance standards were measured on the basis of the volume 
of wood certified for example, this would make the fSC appear less efficient and 
therefore less attractive to loggers, and could lead to a loss of market share.
this proliferation of transnational networks that combine public and private 
authorities – which are often interlinked – attests to the undeniable support for 
private voluntary standards globally. furthermore, although the actors involved 
tend to stress that these networks primarily address the “need for dialogue” and 
the “sharing of experiences” that the proliferation of standards has created, such a 
phenomenon highlights concerns from public authorities that they have been caught 
slightly off guard by the explosion in these instruments, and their willingness to 
refocus on the issue and take control of their development. n
A plAnet for l ife 225
reFerences
Bartley t. and Smith S.n., 2010, “Communities of 
practice as cause and consequence of transnational 
governance”, in: Djelic m.l. and Quack S. (eds.), 
Transnational Communities. Shaping Global Economic 
Governance, Cambridge University press: 347-374.
Busch l., 2011, Standards: Recipes for Reality, the mit 
press. 384 p.
Campbell h., 2005, “the rise and rise of eurepGap: 
european (re)invention of Colonial food rela-
tions?”, international Journal of Sociology of food 
and agriculture, 13 (2): 6-19.
Cheyns, e., 2011, “multi-stakeholder initiatives for sus-
tainable agriculture: the limits of the ‘inclusiveness’ 
paradigm”, in: ponte et al., Governing through stand-
ards: origins, drivers and limits. london: palgrave.
Daviron B., vagneron i, 2011, from Commoditisation 
to De-commoditisation… and Back again: Discussing 
the role of Sustainability Standards for agricultural 
products. Development Policy Review, 29(1): 91-113.
Djama m., fouilleux e., vagneron i., 2011, “Standard 
Setting, Certifying and Benchmarking: a Governmen-
tality approach to Sustainability Standards in the 
agro-food Sector” In: ponte, S., vestergaard, J.&  Gib-
bon, p. (eds.), Governing through standards: Origins, 
drivers and limits. london: palgrave:187-209.
fouilleux e., 2010, les standards volontaires, instru-
ments montants des politiques agricoles et alimen-
taires. entre internationalisation et privatisation, 
in: hervieu et al., Les Mondes Agricoles en Politique, 
presses de Science po, paris: 372-396.
henson S., 2008, the role of public and private Stan-
dards in regulating international food markets, 
Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Devel-
opment, 4(1):63-81.
Jaffee S., henson S., Standards and agri-food export 
from Developing Countries. rebalancing the Debate, 
Policy Research Working Paper Series, 3348, Washing-
ton (D. C.), World Bank, 2004.
raynolds l., 2004, the Globalization of organic agro-
food networks, World Development, 32(5):725-743.
raynolds l., murray D.l., Wilkinson J., 2007, fair 
trade. the challenges of transforming globalization, 
routeledge.
porter m.e., Kramer m.r., 2006, “Strategy and soci-
ety: the link between competitive advantage and cor-
porate social responsibility”, Harvard Business Review, 
84(12):78-92.
reinicke W.h., 1998, Global public policy: governing 
without government?, Washington: Brookings institu-
tion press.
van huijstee m., Glasbergen p., 2008, “the practice 
of Stakeholder Dialogue between multinationals and 
nGos”, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environ-
ment Management, 15:298-310.
Zadek S., 2008, Global Collaborative Governance: 
there is no alternative”, Corporate Governance, 
8(4):374-388.
